communal violence

Substantially supportedEvery enumerated limb of the claim is documented from the state's own published records: extreme and sustained under-representation in the higher administration, an administration and university running in a language roughly a quarter of the population could use, a pre-emptive ban on the majority's political organisation followed by some nine thousand arrests, a printed demand by a named committee member that the Muslim minority receive half the legislature, and a militia operating with official complicity that looted Hindu shops and terrorised villages. What is genuinely contested is why and when: Leonard shows the exclusion ran through mulki status, service lineage and Urdu, disadvantaging Hyderabadi Muslims alongside Hindus, and that the state acquired an explicitly confessional ideology only in its last decade — but on the page's own census figures the language qualification and the confessional boundary enclosed nearly the same people, so that distinction holds at the level of intent and dissolves at the level of effect. The claim overstates in two respects: it projects across a dynasty of 1724–1948 evidence that is concentrated in 1884–1948, and it treats as designed a patrimonial order whose worst victims were poor cultivators of every religion. An earlier version of this page cited the 1947 Royal Commission's count of 632 Hindu against 534 Muslim jagirdars as a counterweight; that count is disclaimed by the Commission itself and, read against the Commission's own table of the great estates, points the other way.

OversimplifiedTwo limbs, two answers. "Peaceful" is true of the five days and false of the event: combatant deaths run somewhere between about 600 and about 2,200 depending on which official-looking table is used, and Indian military deaths in the tens — but the goodwill mission Nehru sent found "at least 27 thousand to 40 thousand people lost their lives during and after the police action", and in its working notes set a floor — "could in no way have been less than 25,000" — while expressly excluding anyone who "died fighting". The Military Governor's own figure was about 2,000. "Necessary" is a separate argument, it is not settled by the casualty evidence, and it stays open: the Standstill breaches, the Razakar ambush at Nanaj, the state's loss of control over its own militia and the US Embassy's own conclusion that entering Hyderabad "was the only possible remedy for an impossible situation" are documented, and so are the State Congress camps across the Indian border, Nehru's threat in June 1947 to "encourage rebellion in all states that go against us", India's refusal of the arbitration the Standstill Agreement itself provided for, the launch of the operation three days before the Security Council took up Hyderabad's complaint, and the withdrawal of the Nizam's UN complaint under military occupation.

Substantially supportedEvery clause of the claim as quoted is supported. The Razakars carried out organised armed attacks in which Hindu villagers were killed; a Special Tribunal convicted Qasim Razvi on those facts in 1950 and the Hyderabad High Court affirmed in 1951; the Nizam's government armed and shielded the militia; and the campaign ended with the Indian Army in September 1948. Gorta, Parkal and Bhairanpally each independently satisfy the word 'massacre'. What does not stand is the arithmetic attached downstream of the claim: every state-wide total in circulation for Razakar victims, and every state-wide total in circulation for the Muslims killed in the reprisals that followed, rests on an estimate whose method is either undisclosed or, where disclosed, untested. This page applies the same test to both columns and reports that neither survives it — which is a statement about the evidence, not a claim that the two columns are equivalent.